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Traditional knowledge comprises traditional cultural expressions—such 
as songs, stories, oral traditions, visual and performing arts, and ritual 
and cultural practices—as well as biological knowledge, innovations, and 
practices. It is increasingly being seen as a potential new source of eco-
nomic value in the Pacific Islands region, whether through bioprospecting 
that leads to new medical and scientific breakthroughs or through the 
development of cultural industries and tourism based on cultural prac-
tices. As a result of this and a belief that traditional knowledge is currently 
at risk on a number of fronts—including a decrease in transmission to 
succeeding generations, misappropriation, and problems with imported 
counterfeits—a move to protect it has developed over the past decade. 
This movement has largely focused on the creation, through sui generis 
legislation, of an inalienable and perpetual property right in traditional 
knowledge, vested in its “owners” or “holders.” Sui generis legislation 
in this context refers to custom-built legislation rather than amendments 
to existing intellectual property regimes. However, as argued elsewhere 
(Forsyth 2012), to date, very little attention has been paid to the issue 
of determining who these owners or holders should be (see Haira 2010 
as an exception). Policy makers, both in the region and internationally, 
have tended to gloss over questions of ownership, largely through reli-
ance on the “convenient conceptual haven” provided by the term “com-
munity” (Amit and Rapport 2002, 17). This is problematic because there 
is likely a wide range of views in any given community about how tradi-
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tional knowledge should be accessed and commercialized and who should 
benefit, especially if the economic possibilities seem lucrative (see Forsyth 
2011). Consequently, if the current sui generis move continues, it is essen-
tial to have adequate structures in place to allow questions of ownership 
and control to be worked through in a way that minimizes the potential 
for intra-community tension. The first part of this article therefore high-
lights the institutional and normative issues that are implicated in any 
legislation envisaging group ownership over traditional knowledge and 
identifies a number of regulatory options. The second part then proposes 
an alternative approach to the regulation of traditional knowledge, one 
that is not based on the granting of proprietary rights. It argues that this 
alternative “regulatory toolbox” approach can achieve all the objectives 
for the protection of traditional knowledge that have been articulated 
in the development of the sui generis legislation but avoids many of the 
potential sites of conflict inherent in such an approach.
The regulatory toolbox presented here contains a variety of different 
regulatory strategies (some “hard” and some “soft” law) that can be cre-
atively combined to address specific issues related to the protection of 
traditional knowledge. It is based on the idea that protecting traditional 
knowledge involves many different issues and objectives (discussed herein) 
and also that these can best be achieved by developing individually tai-
lored approaches rather than by attempting to remedy everything in one 
piece of legislation. The concept of regulation used in this article includes 
legal rules and standards but also other social activities such as “persua-
sion, influence, voluntary compliance and self-regulation” (Braithwaite 
2006, 19). Indeed, Christine Parker and John Braithwaite have argued 
that “regulation means influencing the flow of events” (2003, 119). This 
broad concept is necessary in a region such as the Pacific Islands where the 
reach of the state is often limited and much norm enforcement occurs at a 
non-state level through customary institutions, churches, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, and civil society.
The sui generis legislation referred to in this article comprises three 
pieces of regional legislation and also a raft of draft national legislation. 
The regional legislation comprises the Regional Framework for the Protec-
tion of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Culture (2002) (here-
inafter, “Regional Framework”), adopted by the Forum Trade Ministers 
in 2003; the Traditional Biological Knowledge, Innovations and Practices 
Model Law (“Model Law”), adopted by the Forum Trade Ministers in 
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2008; and the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)’s draft Treaty on Tra-
ditional Knowledge 2011 (“Treaty”), which was approved in principle by 
MSG members in April 2011 but has not as yet been signed by all of them. 
The national legislation is currently in preparation in seven countries in 
the region under the impetus of the Pacific Islands Forum’s Traditional 
Knowledge Action Plan 2010.16ëPRDªV/DZ5HIRUP&RPPLVVLRQLVDOVR
currently working on developing traditional knowledge policy and leg-
islation (Samoa Law Reform Commission 2010). However, none of the 
national legislation is currently publically available. In Vanuatu, a section 
on indigenous knowledge already exists within the Copyright Act 2000, 
which legally came into force in 2011. In a number of countries, the legisla-
tion is being drafted on the basis of considerable public consultation; how-
ever, my fieldwork to date confirms that it is likely that all will essentially 
follow the general approach in the Regional Framework, Model Law, and 
Treaty of creating perpetual rights in the owners of traditional knowledge 
to exclude others from using it without their prior informed consent. For 
example, Erika Teschera stated that the Fijian legislation will be based 
on the Regional Framework and “will, for example, include a register of 
dances and anyone wanting to perform a contemporary version will need 
to provide compensation to the heritage custodians” (2011, 331).
The aims of the Regional Framework and the Treaty are broad and 
encompass three main objectives: the conservation of traditional knowl-
edge in the face of pressures resulting from rapid social change, the pre-
vention of misappropriation, and the facilitation of the commercialization 
of traditional knowledge by the traditional knowledge holders themselves. 
The Model Law does not specify any objectives, but recent guidelines state 
that the objectives are “to protect the rights of traditional owners in their 
[traditional knowledge] and provide them with the means to control the 
commercialisation of their [traditional knowledge] and ensure that such 
commercialisation is subject to their prior informed consent and the fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from that utilisation with the 
traditional owners” (Haira 2010, 2.1). The question of whether all these 
objectives can be successfully met under the proposed legislation has been 
discussed elsewhere (see Forsyth 2011). The argument of this article is 
that, even if these objectives could be achieved by a sui generis approach, 
they could also be achieved by the regulatory toolbox approach with less 
risk of generating intra-community conflict and less use of government 
resources.
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Institutional and Normative Issues Concerning 
Ownership in a Sui Generis Framework
This section addresses a number of issues that arise once rights to con-
trol and benefit from traditional knowledge are created by the state, such 
as those that accompany the sui generis legislation. These issues fall into 
four broad categories, based on the following questions: In whom should 
the rights be vested? On what basis is the membership of the ownership 
group determined? What forum should be responsible for applying these 
rules? And what form of representation should the group take in its deal-
ings with outsiders and internal resource allocation? If a proprietary rights 
approach is implemented, it is imperative that clear regulatory structures 
are established to deal with these issues in order to avoid the sorts of 
conflicts that have arisen over natural resources and land in the region 
in the past (see, eg, Haley and May 2007; Bennett 2002; Hassall 2005; 
Nari 2000; Filer 1990, 2006). Those conflicts have proven to be deeply 
destabilizing and so cut across the ostensible development objective of 
this kind of rights-based approach. In addition, there are many examples 
internationally of cases where the difficulties of determining with whom 
to negotiate, and in whose interests compensation should be paid, have 
led to the failure of traditional knowledge–based projects and to increased 
community discord (see Dalibard and Kono 2009, 254). Graham Dutfield 
detailed one example in which even “the most sincere and painstakingly 
worked out efforts to do prior informed consent right” led to “sharp divi-
sions among the [local community], and decidedly unsatisfactory levels of 
representation” (2009, 281–282). At present, both the Regional Frame-
work and the Treaty are very unclear about determinations of ownership 
in the event of a dispute, as is the Vanuatu Copyright Act. All essentially 
provide that if there is a dispute over ownership that the parties cannot 
work out by themselves, then decisions about third-party use will be made 
by a state authority, which will also be the beneficiary of any payments. 
The Model Law contains significantly more detail about how ownership 
disputes should be managed, but as discussed below, any national legisla-
tion based on it will have to consider a number of supplementary issues.
,QZKRPVKRXOGWKHULJKWVEHYHVWHG"
If a state creates statutory proprietary rights over traditional knowledge, 
the first question is whether those rights are given to the state or to a 
particular subsection of the population. This question is a particularly 
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difficult one in the context of diffused traditional knowledge—that is, tra-
ditional knowledge or expressions of culture that may be spread through-
out a country or even a region. For example, it may be that a particular 
plant grows throughout a country and in a number of places is used as 
an antiseptic. If a pharmaceutical company goes into a particular commu-
nity and that community shares the plant and the associated traditional 
knowledge, who should benefit from a possible future development of this 
knowledge into a new medicine? Should it be just the traditional healer 
who imparts the knowledge? Or his or her community as a whole? Or all 
communities that hold the same knowledge? Or should it be the state? 
Some of the advantages and disadvantages of these different approaches 
are as follows.
The option of vesting the rights in the state has the advantage of sim-
plicity; it promotes certainty and accessibility for third parties and may 
also simplify taking legal action against misappropriation because legal 
title is clearly established. The state is presumed (often wrongly) to have 
sufficient resources to safeguard its rights through legal action. The state 
could be directed to use any proceeds from prosecuting infringements for 
the public benefit, or to promote cultural development, as is provided, for 
example, in section 42(2) of the Vanuatu Copyright Act. State ownership 
is the approach taken in most countries with regard to tangible natural 
resources below land, such as gas or minerals. The Palauan legislation 
also vests ownership of all traditional knowledge in the state “unless and 
until” official ownership is awarded to a traditional group, clan, or com-
munity (section 16).
This approach is, however, likely to be viewed unfavorably by many 
Pacific Islanders, for whom the state is still often seen as a remote and alien 
HQWLW\)RUH[DPSOHDJRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHLQ6ëPRDWROGPH§3HR-
ple are defensive about the government regulating traditional knowledge. 
They think we are coming out to rob them of their knowledge so that we 
FDQPDNHPRQH\RXWRILW¨LQWHUYLHZ6ëPRD$SULO2011). State ownership 
is also likely to impede the dynamic and spontaneous development of tra-
ditional knowledge, as bureaucratic procedures would be introduced that 
would undermine the non-state context in which it is generated (see Forsyth 
2011, 2012). A further concern is that absolute control by the state may 
place traditional knowledge at risk of being used in a corrupt manner for 
the benefit of state officials, rather than for national benefit (see Larmour 
1997; Synexe 2010, 36). The analogy with natural resources should also 
sound notes of caution, given the region’s experiences of the cataclysmic 
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social and environmental consequences of government decision making 
over natural resources in the past (see, eg, Filer 1990 in relation to Bougain-
ville; Burton 2005 in relation to the Fly region of Papua New Guinea). For 
example, a Solomon Islands–based nongovernmental organization is cur-
rently campaigning in relation to a cobalt nickel mine where, as the orga-
nization’s leader complained to me, “the . . . Government is controlling all 
matters and Indigenous landowners are left to be bystanders” (pers comm, 
11 Aug 2011). If control is vested in the state, the designated authority 
should be given a very clear mandate to be as consultative as possible and 
to act in the interests of all current and future users and beneficiaries of tra-
ditional knowledge. Measures should also be put in place to ensure trans-
parency of decision making and disbursement of financial benefits.
The second option is to give ownership to the particular community, 
group, clan, or individual that is viewed as being responsible for traditional 
knowledge on the basis of customary law. This is the approach adopted 
in the sui generis legislation in the region, a draft international treaty, and 
the unesco (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nization)–wipo (World Intellectual Property Organization) Model Laws 
(unesco-wipo 1985; wipo Secretariat 2011). It has the benefit of empow-
ering those most closely associated with the practice and seeks to take into 
account the normative and social context of traditional knowledge as an 
essentially local phenomenon. However, experiences of disputes over land 
and resource extraction in the South Pacific over the past few decades 
(Haley and May 2007; Bennett 2002; Hassall 2005; Nari 2000; Filer 2006) 
demonstrate that not all members of a community have the same notions 
of how to manage a particular resource and that there is likely to be ten-
sion and conflict in determining what types of development take place, 
who is eligible to benefit, and by how much (see Forsyth 2012). In relation 
to mining in Melanesia, Colin Filer argued that “the anthropological stud-
ies . . . challenge notions of unified interest or consensus at the local level, 
revealing ambivalence and contradictions” (2006, 221). If a community or 
social group is designated the beneficiary in traditional knowledge legisla-
tion, the possibility of intra- and intercommunity conflict must be factored 
in. This then necessitates consideration of the following issues.
:KDWQRUPVVKRXOGEHWKHEDVLVIRUGHFLGLQJJURXSPHPEHUVKLS"
If a determination is made that ownership should go to a particular group 
within a country as a whole, a decision needs to be made about what crite-
ria should be used to determine the membership of that group. Of course, 
forsyth  regulating traditional knowledge 7
this is complicated by the fact that determinations of ownership are some-
times made not only by governments but also by investors such as oil 
companies who want to find out whom to do business with. The question 
of group membership is likely to be particularly problematic in situations 
where original communities have been affected by large-scale external (or 
internal) migration. The best-established source for norms to determine 
conflicting claims to rights over traditional knowledge is customary law. 
There are also strong philosophical reasons for using customary law. As 
Anthony Taubman argued, “the recognition of customary law consider-
ations may become a powerful factor in promoting cultural recognition 
and survival” (2005, 554). However, on a practical level, there can be radi-
cally different views about what customary law provides about ownership 
(see Forsyth 2012). One reason for this is that the sui generis legislation 
is based on Western concepts of ownership and not on customary con-
cepts of rights and obligations, despite some attempts to reflect customary 
notions, such as provision for communal ownership and perpetual rights. 
While customary norms have been used, and in many instances continue 
to be used, in many Pacific societies to regulate access to knowledge, these 
differ from the creation of proprietary rights in traditional knowledge by 
the state in at least the following respects.
First, in the past there were different types of knowledge with different 
sorts of constraints around their use (eg, secret, hereditary, public, ritual, 
restricted, alienable, inalienable), which created a situation that  Branislav 
Hazucha and Toshiyuki Kono referred to as “differential access” (2009, 
151). In contrast, sui generis legislation gives knowledge holders the right 
to impose whatever type of conditions they want before giving their “prior 
informed consent” to the use of their traditional knowledge. The legis-
lation neither presumes nor references the possibility of any preexisting 
customary limits to the “right” of the knowledge holder. This is also in 
contrast to Western intellectual property law in which, in theory at least, 
a series of limitations on the owners’ rights (such as a limited time period) 
serves to ensure a balance among them, the users, and the “public domain” 
of works available for all to use.
Second, the commercialization potential of traditional knowledge 
today and increased awareness of Western intellectual property rights are 
likely to alter the way people view exchanges of traditional knowledge 
and what they use it for (see Pigliasco 2010, 170). This may lead to the use 
of powers of exclusion and control in a non-customary way. For example, 
the significant increase in disputes over chiefly title in Vanuatu has been 
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attributed to “the money that can be derived from involvement in the 
leasing out of land, especially to outside investors” (Evans, Goddard, and 
Paterson 2011, 23).
Third, customary “rules” about use of traditional knowledge were often 
broken as part of a dynamic development process. Thus Thorolf Lipp 
argued that in Vanuatu, “It is often high-ranking elder men who act on 
the right to bring about cultural change by overstepping common men’s 
law and perhaps making new laws and making or remaking traditions” 
(Pigliasco and Lipp 2011, 383). In a Polynesian context, Sean Mallon 
argued, “Samoan tufuga [experts] themselves have historically been and 
still are significant transgressors of ‘tradition’ or fa‘asamoa [the Samoan 
way]” (2005, 167). This suggests that such customary norms concerning 
use of traditional knowledge work in practice in very different ways to 
state rules, which have no built-in expectation of being broken.
In addition, the effect of legislative intervention in customary law in 
other contexts has been to freeze and render anachronistic cultural prac-
tices that could otherwise have been dynamic. This has been noted in a 
number of other contexts, most specifically in relation to land (see Cro-
combe 1995). Thus the use of customary norms to determine questions 
of entitlement to rights created by state legislation may be problematic, 
especially given that such norms would be required to be applied in situa-
tions in which membership of a group is not dictated by physical bound-
aries and in which there are many different registers of membership (see 
Forsyth 2012). On the other hand, customary law is an evolving phenom-
enon, and, if the right conditions are provided to nourish it (see below), 
it may prove capable of producing legitimate and satisfactory answers to 
questions of entitlement.
The alternative is to create a set of criteria in state legislation that does 
not reference customary law. The criteria might, for example, be based on 
residence in a particular location, proof of ancestry of a particular clan or 
lineage, or actual knowledge and use of the relevant traditional knowl-
edge. Such criteria would have the advantage of simplicity but may result 
in individual cases of unfairness, as they would inevitably disentitle some 
who believe they have legitimate claims according to custom.
:KLFKLQVWLWXWLRQVKRXOGEHUHVSRQVLEOHIRULPSOHPHQWLQJ 
WKRVHQRUPVLQWKHHYHQWRIDGLVSXWHRYHUHQWLWOHPHQWV"
If a dispute over ownership or control over traditional knowledge does 
arise, it is necessary to have a forum in which the dispute can be adjudi-
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cated. The available options are state courts, customary institutions, or a 
hybrid institution. Daniel Evans and his coauthors defined hybrid courts 
as ones that “straddle the divide between state and custom: their legislative 
foundation provides a degree of certainty and oversight, while an incor-
poration of custom, mediation and informal decision making means that 
they can be responsive to, and accommodating of, local values and mores” 
(Evans, Goddard, and Paterson 2011, 34). The msg Treaty proposes the 
msg Secretariat as a decision-making body in the event of an inter-country 
dispute about ownership, but it is a political forum that lacks the requisite 
expertise in both customary law and dispute resolution.
The choice of institution is clearly closely tied to the question of which 
norms should be used to determine the “owners” of traditional knowledge. 
I have argued elsewhere that common law–based state courts are generally 
ill equipped to implement customary law, as customary law is at least as 
much about process as it is about norms (see Forsyth 2011). Pigliasco also 
argued: “Property is a social practice in which people engage. It is a social 
relationship, inclusive of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities, which 
governs the powers legitimized in particular cultural contexts of socially 
recognized individuals over tangible or intangible things” (2010, 169). 
Pigliasco’s comments were made in the context of Fiji but have wider 
application for Pacific Islands. Giving jurisdiction to state courts risks 
undermining these social relations, and hence the very basis on which tra-
ditional knowledge is built. Such reasons have led many countries in the 
region where customary law is the basis of land law to delegate authority 
to hybrid courts such as the Samoan Land and Titles Court, the Vanuatu 
Customary Land Tribunals, and Solomon Islands Local Courts. In addi-
tion to needing to deal with the problem of how state courts can imple-
ment customary process, any decision to grant state courts jurisdiction 
over rights to traditional knowledge would also have to take into account 
questions of legitimacy of decisions, accessibility of state courts (in terms 
of cost and physical proximity) for litigants, and the ability of the court 
system to cope with additional workload in acceptable time frames.
The second option is customary institutions. These are in the best posi-
tion to implement customary law from a procedural perspective and also 
have an inherent legitimacy. However, in many parts of the region, such 
mechanisms have been severely negatively affected by the introduction of 
the state justice system into what was previously a stateless society and 
by the pressures of rapid social change over the past decade as a result of 
globalization (see Forsyth 2009, 95). For example, in many places, there 
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has been a shift from traditional economies, over which customary lead-
ers had a great deal of control, to a cash economy, over which they have 
little control; and populations are increasingly mobile, which takes people 
out of the sphere of influence of their customary leaders. Giving decision-
making responsibility to such institutions, without inquiring into their 
ability and willingness to cope with the demands that may consequently 
be made of them, runs the risk of resulting in outcomes determined by 
the political strength of those involved. Strong actors would often be able 
either to manipulate the process or to simply refuse to follow decisions 
made by a customary institution (Forsyth 2012). Therefore, if customary 
institutions are given responsibility to decide such disputes under state 
legislation, they should also be provided with the necessary resources to 
allow them to carry out their additional responsibilities. This may mean 
encouraging customary decision makers to collectively brainstorm prob-
lems and solutions raised by these new issues (as is done in judicial confer-
ences); providing mechanisms to ensure that parties attend meetings when 
required to do so; mandating customary institutions as the sole forum for 
resolving such disputes; and providing support for the finality of decisions 
at a customary level.
A further problem with customary institutions is that, as Pigliasco 
pointed out, people outside the community “have no incentive to respect 
norms in the interest of the general community; fear of sanctions is simply 
nonexistent due to the elders’ lack of jurisdiction” (Pigliasco and Lipp 
2011, 390). To overcome this problem, customary institutions may some-
times need to have their decisions enforced by a state court with author-
ity over those outside the community. A possible model for this is fish-
HULHVPDQDJHPHQWLQ6ëPRD8QGHUWKLVPRGHOORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVZRUN
to develop fisheries bylaws that are enforced within the village at first 
instance. If this is unsuccessful, the village fono (council of chiefs) can take 
the matter to the Fisheries Division and then to the formal court system 
(Teschera 2006, 375). Establishment of such a system would require an 
appropriate balance between effective support and oversight, as well as 
mechanisms to ensure that customary processes are not overly controlled 
by the state. Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite’s views on enforced self-
regulation, in which there is public enforcement of privately written rules, 
should also inform any such regulatory developments (1992, 101–132).
A final option is the creation of a hybrid body, such as the Samoan Land 
and Titles Court or the PNG Village Court. Although such institutions 
have also experienced considerable difficulties in their operation (see, eg, 
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AusAID 2008, 199, 223; Evans, Goddard, and Paterson 2011), a judi-
cious blend of state and customary regimes is a possible way to move out 
of the conundrum presented by the problems of a purely state- or purely 
customary-based dispute-resolution mechanism in areas where these insti-
tutions are experiencing operational problems (see also Brown 2005, 53). 
The Model Law (article 13) envisages a hybrid “Traditional Ownership 
Tribunal,” which it requires to consist of three people with “expertise in 
the area under dispute.” It is not clear whether this expertise should be in 
customary law or in the actual practice of the relevant traditional knowl-
edge. This tribunal is tasked with resolving questions of ownership using 
rules of procedure modeled on a state court, and it is to “hear all such 
evidence as it considers necessary to hear” before disposing of the case. 
This model raises many questions, including the following: How can lay 
decision makers be expected to know and enforce state court procedure? 
What norms or criteria should be used in reaching a decision (as this is not 
specified anywhere)? What could be the legal basis of an appeal to a state 
court (since such appeals are provided for)? And how can the parties be 
assured that the tribunal is independent? (This is a particularly important 
question given that the entire process is completely discretionary.)
In implementing such a tribunal in national legislation, as well as 
addressing the questions above, legislators would do well to recall what 
Evans and his coauthors identified as features of a well-functioning hybrid 
system: effective oversight by an independent body, adequate resourcing, 
underlying legislation that is easy to understand and clearly delineates the 
responsibilities of the court, and extensive community consultation and 
involvement (2011, 30–33). The problem of appeals from hybrid courts 
to state courts has been a feature of a number of such courts in the region, 
and it is recommended that a limited right to appeal is granted to help 
ensure finality of decision making.
+RZVKRXOGWKHFRPPXQLW\UHSUHVHQWLWVHOIWRRXWVLGHUV 
DQGGLVWULEXWHEHQHILWVLQWHUQDOO\"
The fourth key issue that arises from a decision to grant a group propri-
etary rights over traditional knowledge is determining how that group will 
be represented in dealings with third parties, how decisions will be made, 
and how benefits from any project will be distributed. An established 
and legitimate customary body, if such exists, would be a clear choice for 
 taking responsibility for these functions. However, in the absence of clear 
customary leaders or other functional local institutions, new representa-
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tive bodies would need to be established. This matters in a region where 
claims to leadership titles have become more contested and titles them-
selves are becoming fragmented. Where there are competing local repre-
sentative bodies, it will be necessary to avoid the risk identified by Doro-
thy Noyes that “the best-placed local actors will claim the tradition. They 
will furnish and run the administrative body with a relatively free hand. 
The predictable results, in the aggregate, will be the further commercial-
ization, corruption and control of local traditions” (2006, 35). Such risks 
can only be negated by ensuring widespread consultation in local commu-
nities, rather than calling for local representatives to contact centralized 
state agencies, as is currently envisaged in the Regional Framework and 
Model Law, for example. Governments and international aid organiza-
tions should be wary of accepting claims of ownership at face value and 
should conduct some exploratory research to determine what the opera-
tional reality of the situation really is before making any decisions.
The issue of who benefits from new revenue sources within a commu-
nity can also be complicated. In relation to the Bougainville mine, Filer 
commented that although it was assumed that customary norms of dis-
tribution and consumption would apply to the new forms of wealth, this 
assumption was proven false (1990, 12). A particular concern is ensuring 
that women are not excluded from the benefits of traditional knowledge. 
The result of legislation over customary land in many places in the Pacific 
has been to consolidate ownership in the hands of men. For example, an 
AusAID report found that of the 87 percent of land under customary own-
HUVKLSLQ6ëPRDZRPHQRQO\RZQ10 percent, and this limited ownership 
“constrains their productive potential” (Drucza and Hutchens 2008). In 
relation to Vanuatu, McDonnell stated that “the identities manufactured 
by contemporary land legislation in Vanuatu, coupled with the social con-
text in which they are situated, work to prevent ni-Vanuatu women from 
claiming, at least in most public contexts, their interests in land” (2011, 
13). Introducing legislation to give agency to “the community” without 
paying attention to internal power imbalances may very well similarly 
allow powerful male figures to stop women or marginal groups in a com-
munity from benefiting from a resource they currently possess (in the con-
text of PNG mining, see Macintyre 2007, 55–56). Relevantly, Madhavi 
Sunder argued, “As critical legal theorists have aptly warned, we must 
stand ready to openly question when and how ‘rights’ might work to the 
disadvantage of the poor rather than to the poor’s benefit” (2007, 116). 
She discussed a study by the national Commission on Women in India that 
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argues that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty (trips), by re-characterizing “women’s farming knowledge as ‘raw 
materials’ for corporations to appropriate, has reduced women’s profits 
and led to a corresponding rise in violence against women” (Sunder 2007, 
121–122).
The alternatives to customary structures are unincorporated associa-
tions, companies, partnerships, cooperatives, trusts, registered businesses, 
and a range of other structures variously provided for in legislation across 
the region. There is, however, some reason to be cautious about the 
appropriateness of imported Western organizational structures for mak-
ing decisions regarding, and distributing benefits from, traditional knowl-
edge. Past experiences with such structures for community projects in the 
region have often produced very mixed results. For example, a representa-
WLYHRIDVXFFHVVIXOQRQJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQLQ6ëPRDH[SODLQHGWR
me that they preferred to work directly with families because “we have 
IRXQGWKURXJKH[SHULHQFHWKDWLQFRPHJHQHUDWLRQLQSDUWLFXODULQ6ëPRD
doesn’t work in a community group, it ends up becoming a fundraising 
and doesn’t end up putting cash in people’s pockets where they need it. 
There is also the particular politics that goes on in villages and that can 
LPSDFWRQWKHSURMHFW¨LQWHUYLHZ$SLD6ëPRD7 April 2011). There is a 
need for more research to be undertaken in this area to identify the advan-
tages and disadvantages of different forms of local representative bodies 
throughout the region. In the only study of civil society organizational 
structures in the region, Stephan Klingelhofer and David Robinson argued 
that the legislation that does exist is outdated, does not fit well with local 
conceptions of culture, and is the subject of a great deal of uncertainty in 
the community (2004).
International experiences with local representative bodies in the context 
of negotiations over the biological resources of indigenous communities 
also shows that problems may arise whereby the legitimacy of newly cre-
ated bodies is called into question by different interest groups, resulting 
in the undermining of attempts to negotiate agreements with outsiders 
(Dalibard and Kono 2009, 254–255). This demonstrates the need for such 
bodies to be broadly representative. In addition, any new body that is 
established should be structured to ensure as far as possible that benefits 
are distributed in a way that protects the community’s weaker members, 
as this has often not been the case in the context of distribution of resource 
compensation in the region (see, eg, Burton 2005, 104).
This part has raised a number of institutional and regulatory issues that 
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must be addressed if a sui generis approach is to be successfully imple-
mented. One implication of this discussion is that creating proprietary 
rights over traditional knowledge is likely to be a resource-intensive pro-
cess, both in terms of the cost of creating and funding new institutions and 
in staffing them (see also Brown 2005, 50). The task that such institutions 
will have in resolving disputes is also likely to be extraordinarily difficult. 
A careful cost-benefit analysis or risk analysis would be advisable to deter-
mine whether the potential gains from traditional knowledge will justify 
such expenditure, or whether an alternative approach, such as the one 
below, would be preferable.
The Regulatory Toolbox: A Non-proprietary Rights 
Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge
As mentioned earlier, the focus both in the region and internationally on 
the protection of traditional knowledge has largely been on the creation 
of exclusive proprietary rights through legislation. Although there has 
also been considerable work done in developing so-called soft laws such 
as protocols for museums to use traditional knowledge (see Torsen and 
Anderson 2010), these have not been presented as alternatives to a propri-
etary rights approach. This section seeks to challenge the assumption that 
sui generis legislation is the only way to effectively regulate access to tra-
ditional knowledge. It sets out an alternative approach based on creatively 
combining a range of new and existing mechanisms in a metaphorical 
regulatory toolbox to deal with specific problems or opportunities raised 
by traditional knowledge. This approach has the advantage of flexibility 
and tailoring, thus avoiding any negative consequences of an overly gen-
eralized approach (such as enclosing too much of the public domain). It 
also responds to Michael Brown’s challenge to come up with “creative, 
pragmatic solutions to the un-wanted circulation of traditional cultural 
expressions” (2010, 573).
Customary laws and institutions are a crucial part of the regulatory 
toolbox and should be centralized as much as possible in any initiatives 
concerning traditional knowledge. The regulation of traditional knowl-
edge is just one more reason to step up support for such institutions as 
they redevelop themselves in light of modern conditions. For example, 
the secretary of the Vanuatu National Council of Chiefs stated that in 
order to protect traditional knowledge it is necessary to protect the sys-
tem of customary governance in which it exists (interview, Vanuatu, 29 
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July 2011). There should be a general inclination for the state, donors, 
and nongovernmental organizations to support local initiatives concern-
ing traditional knowledge when doing so is expedient, just, and would not 
unfairly prejudice other members of the community. Any regulatory initia-
tive should adopt measures that emphasize the importance of social net-
works and customary relationships, as these are the basis of creativity in 
Pacific Island societies. James Leach argued, “Laws that take . . . property 
relations as their baseline inhibit the utilization of indigenously appropri-
ate mechanisms for the control, distribution, and protection of indigenous 
resources” (2005, 37). A non-proprietary approach therefore has a better 
chance of being able to creatively support existing social relations and 
institutions in their struggles to cope with new pressures and opportuni-
ties created by the commodification of traditional knowledge. Instead of 
facing customary institutions with the problem of determining “owner-
ship,” this approach would, for example, advocate supporting them as 
they determine appropriate access policies and distribution mechanisms.
Some other regulatory mechanisms that could be instituted to address 




It could be made an offense to use traditional knowledge in a way that a 
significant section of the population would find offensive or derogatory. 
Such a section could be inserted into a country’s Copyright Act or even 
Crimes Act. This would deal with situations in which, for example, tra-




There should be increased emphasis in government programs and work 
by donors and nongovernmental organizations on the value of traditional 
knowledge as a source of cultural richness as well as a potential source 
of revenue, on the possibility of developing it in new ways, and on the 
importance of attributing its origin. Public attribution is often extremely 
valued and is much more likely to be freely given in the absence of claims 
to proprietary rights and fears of criminal or civil sanctions. For example, 
the Samoan Ministry of Culture collects traditional stories and publishes 
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them for school students. It never pays the people who have given their 
stories, but it invites the contributors to the launch of the volume and 
publicly acknowledges their contribution. According to the acting direc-
tor, contributors are happy with such measures.
At the same time, it would be useful to increase people’s awareness 
regarding the extent to which expressions of culture have historically been 
shared across the Pacific and to publicly celebrate the help that one group 
can give to another in revitalization initiatives, such as the help of the 
Samoan tattoo specialists in revitalizing traditional tattooing in Tonga and 
Tahiti. The more people are aware of how they have benefited from the 
cross-flow of culture, the less likely they are to be resentful about sharing 
their own culture. The awareness that intellectual property rights “cut 
both ways” is not widespread in the region. This initiative could build on 
Pacific Islanders’ proud tradition of creating linkages and building net-
works throughout the region.
(VWDEOLVKRUUHLQIRUFHDUHVHDUFKSHUPLWVFKHPH 
IRURYHUVHDVUHVHDUFKHUV
The potential problem of misappropriation of traditional knowledge by 
researchers could be addressed by the establishment of a research permit 
scheme (or the strengthening of those that already exist in Vanuatu, Fiji, 
and Solomon Islands, for instance). Such a scheme could be used to moni-
tor the types of researchers who are permitted to enter the country and 
to impose conditions on the types of traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources that can be collected, as well as on the uses that can be made 
of them. Although such schemes currently exist in a number of countries, 
they are mostly in need of support and reform, as it is relatively easy for 
researchers to come in “under the radar” simply by pleading ignorance 
of any permit requirements, and authorities also generally do not capture 
the increasing number of local researchers who are working on master’s 
degrees and PhDs in their own countries. In order to ensure that all foreign-
ers entering the country are aware of the requirement for a research per-
mit, a question could be included on the immigration form about whether 
persons intend to conduct any research during their visit. If so, they should 
be referred to the appropriate state authority and required to apply for a 
research permit. The permit application should directly ask researchers 
about whether they will access traditional knowledge, any potential com-
mercial uses that may arise from their research, and what steps will be 
taken to ensure that any traditional knowledge accessed will be treated 
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appropriately. The current, open-answer type of questions common on 
research permit forms facilitates an avoidance of these issues. The research 
permit may also impose a contractual requirement upon researchers that 
any commercial use of traditional knowledge must be the subject of a 
benefit-sharing agreement with the government, a particular group, or a 
combination of both (see below). Resources should be put into adequately 
policing this scheme, for example by working with customs to institute 
spot checks on material leaving the country, requiring researchers to work 
with local counterparts, and requiring a final report before researchers 
are permitted to leave. Some countries, such as Tonga, have created a sys-
tem in which researchers are required to pay large (us$2,000) deposits to 
conduct research. However, this unfairly discriminates against researchers 
with little funding and also fails to ensure that conditions will be com-
plied with when the potential gains to be made are high and therefore 
worth forfeiting the bond. Importantly, to encourage compliance, coun-
tries implementing a research permit scheme should also ensure that the 
processes for applying for research permits are transparent and not unrea-
sonably demanding and that permits are processed in a timely manner.
([SORUHDUDQJHRIEHQHILFLDULHVLQDFFHVVDQGEHQHILWVKDULQJ
DJUHHPHQWVUHVXOWLQJIURPWKHXVHRIWUDGLWLRQDONQRZOHGJH
Access and benefit sharing agreements are also an important regulatory 
tool in a non-proprietary rights approach to regulating access to tradi-
tional knowledge. They can be mandated as part of a condition for a 
research permit and therefore do not need to be based on the creation of 
proprietary rights in traditional knowledge. Freeing such agreements from 
particular ownership groups in fact allows for more flexibility with regard 
to beneficiaries and recognizes that there may not be a single approach to 
the vesting of rights that works in every situation. Indeed, as suggested 
to me by Vanuatu’s minister of justice, Ralph Regenvanu, it may be that 
different sorts of commercial exploitation require different beneficiary 
groups (interview, Vanuatu, 22 July 2011). For example, use of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources, which may be spread over 
the country as a whole, may require different sets of beneficiaries than 
expressions of culture, which are more often unique to a particular area. 
Different beneficiary groups may also be appropriate depending on the 
amount of potential benefit at stake. An access and benefit sharing agree-
ment may stipulate that a certain percentage of benefits from a license 
to use traditional knowledge should go to the state and that a certain 
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percentage should go to particular communities and individuals. This was 
GRQH LQ DQ DJUHHPHQW EHWZHHQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW RI 6ëPRD DQG WKH8QL-
versity of California concerning patenting of genetic material from the 
mamala plant (Homalanthus nutans)*RYHUQPHQWRI6ëPRD2004).
Another option is to establish a trust that would be in charge of distri-
bution of any profits to the whole or certain segments of the community. 
For example, in Peru, the benefits of agreements for use of traditional 
knowledge are shared between the contracting indigenous community and 
the wider community through an indigenous development fund managed 
by indigenous people (Tobin and Taylor 2009, 29). This is the model being 
developed by the Kava Emporium in Vanuatu as part of its plans to pro-
duce a product that essentially allows the active component of kava to be 
put into a whole range of beverages. There is a potentially large interna-
tional market for such a product. Working with two government minis-
ters, the directors of the company, both long-term residents of Vanuatu, 
have established a trust that will have a percentage share of the production 
company, and the trustees will use the funds as they see fit. The directors’ 
reasons for preferring to work this way, rather than to direct benefits back 
to the specific communities from which the kava is sourced, is that such 
tracing back would be too difficult to track and also would provoke com-
munity jealousy. They explained to me that they voluntarily came up with 
this option, as they knew they would “face problems” if they remained in 
Vanuatu and profited from such an enterprise without sharing that profit 
in some way (interview, Vanuatu, 27 July 2011). This demonstrates that 
social factors such as adverse publicity and shaming can be powerful regu-
lating factors, especially in small communities characteristic of the Pacific 
Islands, and can require even resident third parties to enter into access and 
benefit sharing arrangements.
'HYHORSVWURQJDXWKHQWLFLW\EUDQGLQJVFKHPHV
A number of countries in the region face problems with cheaper, imported 
handicrafts being sold to tourists, thus reducing the market for authentic 
cultural products. This can be partially dealt with by developing strong 
branding schemes for expressions of culture that are based on traditional 
knowledge, both for the national and the international market. The 
Samoan tufuga (tattoo experts) provide an excellent example of how a 
market for the “real deal” can be developed by giving broad exposure 
to a particular product. For the past several decades, the tufuga have 
actively promoted Samoan tattooing (tatau) internationally by attending 
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international festivals and giving demonstrations. Although showing the 
world how tatau is performed creates opportunities for misappropria-
tion, in doing so the tufuga have created an expanding market of those 
seeking an authentic tatau (Mallon 2010, 27–28). In a conversation I 
had with one tufuga, he referred to a tatau performed by a machine as 
a “plastic pe‘a”; such remarks and attitudes carefully deployed can have 
an important effect on establishing a market for authentic creations (see 
also Pigliasco 2010, 173, for a discussion of the creation of a demand for 
“original” Fijian firewalking). The commercial implications of branding 
and strong marketing can also be seen in the example of Fiji Water—
which, however, is a foreign-owned company (see Kaplan 2007). This 
feeds into the way that notions of authenticity and ethnicity have become 
sources of value in Western countries (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). 
Brands can be developed by local groups, as has been done by the Tagi-
LOLPD+DQGLFUDIW$VVRFLDWLRQLQ6ëPRD7KHGLUHFWRURIWKDWDVVRFLDWLRQ
commented to me on the effects of registering their trademark as follows: 
“When we registered it in 2008 we had advertisements on TV, radio, and 
in the newspaper to raise awareness of the mark. Since then we have 
had a lot of changes. Our financial reports show that we have been sell-
ing more goods locally. Also we have more markets overseas and greater 
opportunity to go overseas and sell our goods. Also we take our goods 
to sell on the cruise boats and people always ask about our association 
DQGZDQWWRWDNHRXUEXVLQHVVFDUGV¨LQWHUYLHZ6ëPRD7 April 2011). It 
will be important for local groups to be made aware of the importance of 
developing unique brand names, rather than using local place names, for 
example “Pentecost Baskets,” as this could act as a restraint on trade for 
others from that location.
Brands can also be developed by national governments. For example, 
this year Fiji enacted the Industry Emblem Decree 2011, which controls 
the use of a “Fijian Made” emblem and a “Fijian Grown” emblem.2
,QWURGXFHFRQWUROVRQLPSRUWHGKDQGLFUDIWV
The problem of imported handicrafts being sold as local products in 
Pacific Island countries could also be addressed by imposing requirements 
that all imported handicrafts have their place of origin marked clearly on 
them in indelible ink. Import controls could also prohibit the importation 
of fabrics and other goods that utilize traditional designs from that coun-
try, as well as a list of specified handicrafts considered to pertain especially 
to that country. For example, such a provision may be used to stop the 
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current importation into Vanuatu of dresses from China made in the tra-
ditional “island dress” style.
'HYHORSSURWRFROVDQGJXLGHOLQHVIRUXVHRIWUDGLWLRQDONQRZOHGJH
National cultural institutions should develop policies and guidelines to 
assist researchers, archivists, database creators, and so on to conduct their 
work in a manner that respects customary norms concerning access and 
use of traditional knowledge. Fortunately much work has already been 
done in this area (see Torsen and Anderson 2010), providing an excel-
lent basis for further development. The inclusion of local customary lead-
ers and those involved in the practice of traditional knowledge should be 
central to any such initiative. In advocating “soft” law alternatives, such 
as guidelines instead of punishments, Shubha Chaudhuri argued, “Most 
people are not averse to doing the right and ethical thing” (2009, 200). 
These protocols are currently needed as increasing attention is being paid 
to traditional knowledge, as in the case of the incorporation of aspects of 
traditional knowledge into school curriculums and into climate change 
adaptation programs. For example, part of the Vanuatu National Climate 
Change Adaptation Strategy 2012–2022 has involved collecting informa-
tion about traditional knowledge related to adaptation to climate change, 
with the aim of sharing adaptation strategies throughout the country. 
According to the director of a climate change program, “Most felt that 
sharing this as widely as possible (with a view toward helping other com-
munities who may not have developed this knowledge cope with climate 
change) was the appropriate and desirable course of action in this case” 
(pers comm, 2 August 2011).
However, a question that emerges is how to control subsequent uses of 
traditional knowledge compiled for particular purposes. In other words, 
what happens if someone wants to use that traditional knowledge to make 
a commercial profit? There are two possible ways to regulate this. The 
first is to develop licenses to use the traditional knowledge in the relevant 
document or database in accordance with particular terms, such as the 
noncommercial-use licenses developed by Creative Commons.3 Creative 
Commons licenses are, however, based on underlying intellectual property 
law; a breach of the terms of the license is contrary to law because there is 
infringement of copyright. As there is no underlying intellectual property 
right in traditional knowledge, the underlying law in the context of tradi-
tional knowledge would have to be customary law. This would mean that 
if the license terms were breached, there would be a remedy under custom-
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ary law if the use was also an infraction according to customary law. This 
option should be considered in countries where the customary system is 
functioning well. In places where the customary system is not working so 
well, it would be necessary for the state to insert a provision into a piece 
of relevant existing legislation, such as the Copyright Act, stipulating that 
the use of traditional knowledge in databases or compilations in ways that 
are not in accordance with their terms of use is an offense.
'HYHORSQHWZRUNVZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOQRQJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQV
DQGDFDGHPLFVZKRPRQLWRUFDVHVRIELRSLUDF\
One of the major concerns with regard to traditional knowledge as it 
relates to genetic materials is what is called “bioprospecting” or “biopi-
racy,” which essentially involves the exploration and use of biodiversity 
for commercially valuable genetic resources. There is an enormous body 
of literature on this topic (see, eg, Robinson 2010), and much has been 
written about whether it should be treated separately from aspects of tra-
ditional knowledge involving expressions of culture, or whether the two 
concepts are too deeply intermingled in customary worldviews to be able 
to separate (see Forsyth 2011, 270). Further exploration of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this article.4 Instead, what it offers is another example 
of a regulatory tool that can be used to address some aspects of concern 
raised by such practices, namely the co-opting of support from the large 
number of nongovernmental and academic organizations that are actively 
involved in monitoring cases of biopiracy (see, eg, unu-ias 2012). These 
networks can prove invaluable both in highlighting instances in which 
biopiracy is occurring and in bringing sufficient amounts of negative pub-
licity to bear to have the practice stopped. For example, in 2011 a Tai-
wanese researcher was forced to withdraw a US patent application that 
was based on genetic material obtained from blood samples taken from 
Solomon Islanders without their prior informed consent. The patent appli-
cation was unearthed by a Canadian academic who then contacted a Solo-
mon Islands nongovernmental organization through an international one, 
the etc Group (Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentra-
tion). Together they worked with the Solomon Islands government to put 
pressure on the Taiwanese government to force the researcher to withdraw 
the application in early April 2011. Given the limited resources of local 
nongovernmental organizations and even state governments in the region 
to confront such issues, enlisting the assistance of such international orga-
nizations can be of enormous benefit. For example, once researchers leave 
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a Pacific Island country, such nongovernmental organizations could be 
asked to help monitor their compliance with the access and benefit shar-
ing agreements and memorandums of understanding that they signed with 
Pacific Islanders.
6XSSRUWFXOWXUDOIHVWLYDOV
Local festivals are a powerful way to reestablish the importance of tradi-
tional expressions of culture, to increase the intergenerational transfer of 
the knowledge, to share cultural heritage with outsiders, and to allow local 
communities to benefit from increased tourist trade in situ. For example, 
there have been three festivals celebrating Vanuatu Sand Drawing since 
this practice was listed in 2003 as a unesco Masterpiece of the Oral and 
Intangible Heritage of Humanity. The first had seventy participants and 
the latest had 850 participants, ranging from five-year-olds to the very 
elderly. These festivals generated a whole range of new sand drawings and 
resulted in much intergenerational transmission of traditional knowledge. 
The director of the Vanuatu Cultural Centre is firmly of the view that cul-
tural performances should be kept in villages to preserve their prestige and 
mystery (interview, Vanuatu, 2 August 2011). Specially organized local 
events can attract tourists to the villages. Of course, not as many people 
will actually come to a remote village as will watch dances at a resort, but 
those who do make the effort are likely to make meaningful financial con-
tributions to the local community. The director observed that in the past 
some tourists made very generous donations after being impressed by the 
authenticity of the cultural events they witnessed.
To conclude this section, I argue that, judiciously combined, these regu-
latory tools (and others that have yet to be devised) have as much or 
more chance of meeting the objectives of the sui generis legislation as the 
proprietary rights approach. To recap, these objectives are the conserva-
tion of traditional knowledge in the face of pressures resulting from rapid 
social change, the prevention of inappropriate exploitation of traditional 
knowledge, and the facilitation of the commercialization of traditional 
knowledge by the traditional knowledge holders themselves. All three of 
these objectives are met by strengthening the customary institutions cur-
rently regulating access to traditional knowledge. The first objective is 
also met by promoting the use of traditional knowledge by local commu-
nities, for example in national education and climate change programs; 
by recognizing the importance of traditional knowledge through public 
attribution; and by supporting local, national, and regional festivals. The 
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second objective can also be met by imposing limitations on the use of 
traditional knowledge in an offensive or derogatory manner, introducing 
or enhancing a research permit scheme, imposing controls on imported 
handicrafts, developing traditional knowledge use protocols, and creating 
or strengthening links with nongovernmental organizations and academ-
ics involved in countering biopiracy. The third objective can also be met 
by developing strong branding schemes and fair and effective access and 
benefit sharing agreements with international and local research institu-
tions. This is illustrated in table 1.
Although all these initiatives would involve additional resources, the 
cost would not be nearly as much as would be required to effectively 
implement the sui generis legislation, and it may be appropriate for some 
of these resources to come from the beneficiaries themselves in recom-
pense for the added value that will accrue to their traditional knowledge. 
Some of these initiatives also obliquely raise questions about which par-
ticular group is entitled to access or benefit from traditional knowledge, 
Table 1
Objectives regarding Conservation Prevention of Facilitation of 
traditional knowledge  misappropriation commercialization
Regulatory Tools Strengthening Strengthening Strengthening 
 of customary  of customary of customary 
 institutions institutions institutions
 Promoting use Preventing  Strong branding 
  derogatory or schemes 
  offensive use
 Public  Research permit Access and benefit 
 attribution scheme controls sharing agreements
 Cultural  Controls on 
 festivals  imported handi- 
crafts; usage  
protocols; and  
nongovernmental  
and academic  
networks
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and these issues are also likely to surface with increased regularity as the 
discourse of Western intellectual property rights becomes more prevalent 
in the region. However, it can be anticipated that these issues will not be 
as fraught in the regulatory toolbox approach, as they will not arise in 
the context of an all-encompassing legal determination of ownership in 
perpetuity. There will therefore be more room for recourse to negotiation 
and customary modes of resolving disagreements in flexible and holistic 
ways. The different regulatory options proposed above will also be able 
to be developed over time and with the contribution of a wide range of 
international and nongovernmental organizations. Significantly, these sug-
gestions do not require new or improved state institutions and therefore 
place less stress on what are, for the most part, weak state governments.
Conclusion
This article highlights a range of institutional arrangements that must be 
in place if the current proprietary rights approach to the protection of 
traditional knowledge is to be pursued in the Pacific Islands region. It 
argues that because communities and social groups are not always united 
in their views about how best to manage their resources, there must be 
credible forums for managing differences of opinion and interests. As the 
legislation puts control of traditional knowledge into the hands of “own-
ers,” it is very likely that most of the conflicts over traditional knowledge 
will focus on who has ownership rights, and that such questions may be 
very difficult to resolve in practice. Given the fact that ownership of tra-
ditional knowledge in the sense used in the legislation is not a customary 
concept, and given the fragility of many customary institutions around 
the region, it is neither fair nor feasible to simply delegate questions of 
ownership and distribution to customary mechanisms. If such a delega-
tion is made, it must be with sufficient resources to provide people with 
the capacity to meet the new challenges. For these reasons, it may be that 
the proprietary rights approach to traditional knowledge may not be best 
adapted to protecting traditional knowledge in the region. This article 
has therefore proposed an alternative approach, based on a metaphorical 
regulatory toolbox, with a wide range of strategies designed to address 
particular issues raised by the exploitation of traditional knowledge in a 
modern context. This approach deflects questions of ownership and thus 
widens the potential group of beneficiaries and users of traditional knowl-
edge. Choices will always need to be made between access and control in 
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relation to any form of intellectual property. An approach that allows for 
nuanced and targeted regulation should be preferred to an overly broad 
one with the potential for serious negative side effects, such as community 
conflict and concentration of control over traditional knowledge in the 
hands of a finite group of individuals.
Notes
1 These countries are Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, 
Palau, and Papua New Guinea.
2 For a good analysis of some of the issues involved in developing such a 
mark, see iTaukei Trust Fund Board 2012.
3 Further research in this area is planned for a future publication, and a num-
ber of case studies are being collected.
4 Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that provides a range of flex-
ible copyright licenses and tools as an alternative to the “all rights reserved” 
approach; see  http://creativecommons.org/
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Abstract
Traditional knowledge is increasingly being seen as a potential source of eco-
nomic value in the Pacific Islands region. As a result of this, and a belief that 
traditional knowledge is currently at risk in a number of respects, a move to pro-
tect it has developed over the past decade. This move has largely focused on the 
creation, through legislation, of a sui generis inalienable and perpetual property 
right in traditional knowledge, vested in its “owners” or “holders.” However, 
to date, very little attention has been paid to the issue of determining who these 
owners or holders should be. The first part of this article seeks to fill this gap 
by highlighting the institutional and normative issues implicated in any legisla-
tion that envisages group ownership over traditional knowledge. The second part 
proposes an alternative approach to the regulation of traditional knowledge, one 
that is not based on the creation of new proprietary rights. It argues that this 
alternative “regulatory toolbox” approach can achieve the same objectives for the 
protection of traditional knowledge that have been articulated in the push for the 
development of sui generis legislation, while avoiding many of the potential sites 
of conflict inherent in such an approach.
keywords: traditional knowledge, regulation, ownership, community, custom-
ary law
